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ABSTRACT 
Ur~der DOE Order 5481.1, "Safety Analysis and Review System for  DOE 
Operations," safety.analyses are  required for  DOE projects in order to  
en,sure tha t :  (1  ) potential hazards are  systematically ident i f ied;  ( 2 )  
potential impacts are analyzed; (3 )  reasonable measures have been taken 
to  el iminate, control , or mi t iga te  the hazards; and (4 ) .  there i s  documented 
management authorization.of the.DOE operation based on an objective 
assessment of the adequacy of the safety analysis. .This report i s  
intended to provide the DOE Office of Plans and Technology Assessment 
(OPTA)  with an independent evaluation of the adequacy of the ongoing 
safety analysis e f for t .  As part of t h i s  e f fo r t ,  a number of s i t e  v i s i t s  
and interviews were conducted, and FE SARS documents were reviewed. The 
l a t t e r  included SARS Implementation Plans for  a number of FE f i e ld  
off ices ,  as well as safety analysis reports completed for  certain FE 
operations. This report summarizes SARS related ef for t s  a t  the DOE 
f i e ld  off ices  visited and evaluates the extent to  which they f u l f i l l  the 
I requirements of DOE 5481.1. 
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I 
.l. INTRODUCTION: DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT 
The intent of this study was to assist in the overview of DOE ASFE 
Headquarters (HQ)  Safety Analysis a.nd Review System (SARS) requirements. 
This report summarizes observations and recommendations relative to SARS 
implementation to date, both at. the HQ and field* levels. 
As part of this task, site visits were conducted at the Laramie Energy 
Techno1 ogy Center (LETC) , the Chicago Operations and Regional Off ice 
(CORO), and. the U.S. Army Engineer Division, Huntsville. In addition, 
health and safety personnel from the Grand Forks Energy Technology 
Center (GFETC) were interviewed in order to collect further data on SAKS 
activities in the field. Several safety analyses which have been completed 
were reviewed so as to more specifically assess the adequacy of SARS 
actions in meetinp DOE and ASFE requirements. 
The following section of this report summarizes the major findings in 
regard to SARS imp1 ementation. 
*As used herein, DOE "field offices" include Energy Technoloqy Centers 
(ETCs), Operations Offices, and the U.S. Army Engineer Division, Huntsville. 
2.  OBSERVATIONS A N D  FINDINGS 
HEADQUARTERS ASFE 
The major problems in regard t o  SARS implementation ac t iv i t i e s  a t  H Q  
ASFE a r i se  due to  two factors:  (1)  lack of suff ic ient  HQ resources 
( i  . e . ,  s taff ing and funding) ; and ( 2 )  the f a i lu re  to  issue clear  policy 
guidance for  f i e ld  offices to  follow i n  t he i r  SARS ac t iv i t i e s .  The 
issue of resource constraints has been covered extensively in another 
report prepared under t h i s  contract.* SARS implementation imposes a 
substantial workload upon  ASFE. Thus, i f  i t  i s  found to  be impossible 
t o  increase SARS funding and s taff ing a t  H O ,  i t  i s  important tha t  a 
decision be made in regard to  the delegation of certain responsibi l i t ies  
to  the f i e ld .  
On the matter of policy guidance from H Q ,  the FE Order, "Requirements 
and Guide1 ines for  the Safety Analysis and Review System (SARS) ," has 
not yet been issued in final form, and the l a t e s t  available d ra f t  i s .  
I dated May 1980. This inaction on the part of ASFE H O  i s .  causing considerable 
confusion a,t the f i e ld  level.  The f i e ld  operations are  bound by DOE 
5481.1 t o  complete safety analyses.for projects under the i r  cognizance, 
b u t  they have not received guidance from.HQ in regard to  such items as 
suggested content and format of safety analyses and proper routing of 
the reports through the system for  review. 
In regard to  the scheduling and performance of independent reviews of 
the safety analyses, there are  several problems. There i s  often an 
overall lack of communication between those performing the safety analyses 
and those expected to  provide the reviews. This makes planning fo r  the 
reviews very d i f f i c u l t ,  and often causes a bunching effect  where many 
reviews are  required in approximately the same time frame. Ultimately, 
these problems could resu l t  in project delays since SARS compliance i s  a 
prerequisite to  project authorization. There needs to  be a mechanism 
se t  u p  whereby H Q  ASFE can monitor SARS progress for  individual operations. 
Currently, there are  gaps in the available data and there i s  no e f f i c i en t  
means for  identifying new .projects which have SARS requirements in the 
contracts. 
2 . 2  GRAND FORKS ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CENTER (GFETC) 
GFETC i s  responsible for  managing projects including fluidized bed 
combustion ( F B C )  a n d  1 iqr~efaction p i lo t  plants and a fixed bed slagging 
gasif ier .  Prel iminary Risk Assessments ( PRAs) performed on GFETC's 
*"Evaluation of Alternative Review Plans fo r  the Department of Energy 
Safety Analysis and Rev.iew System," February 1981. 
projects have shown the gas i f ie r  and the liquefaction process to  be high 
r isk and the FBC unit  t o  be moderate risk.  The remaining low r i sk  
projects were reviewed a t  the f ie ld  level and no problems were identified.  
Although the liquefaction process was determined to be high r i sk ,  i t s  
r isks are  enclosed and the probability of a major hazard occurring was 
f e l t  t o  be suff ic ient ly  remote for  the safety analysis to  be reviewed 
and for  the project t o  be authorized in-house. 
The basic material for  the g a s i f i e r ' s  safety analysis was provided by 
the operating contractor, Stearns-Roger, and compiled by GFETC. I n i t i a l l y ,  
approximately one hundred items were identified which needed to  be 
corrected in the gas i f ie r .  Weekly meetings were held with both GFETC 
personnel and design, operating, and construction contractor personnel 
present t o  evaluate any problems and proposed changes. 
The GFETC Health and Safety Manager d i rec t ly  reports to  the f a c i l i t y  
Director. Therefore, t h i s  s t a f f  person..is reponsible for  a ler t ing the 
Director of any unacceptable health and safety r isks  due to  any of the 
fac i l i ty ' s 'opera t ions .  In addition, the Health and Safety Manager has 
the authority t o  ac t  on his own where an immediate r i sk  exis ts .  
The intent  a t  GFETC was to  perform a portion of the g a s i f i e r ' s  safety 
analysis review on s i t e .  However, since t h i s  would not ensure a to t a l ly  
independent review, and since the Draft FE Guidelines on SARS specify 
that HQ ASFE i s  t o  authorize high r isk projects and arrange for  review 
of them, the safety analysis report ultimately needed to  be sent to  HQ 
for review. A s t a f f  person a t  HQ was assigned t o  receive the report 
when compl ete.  
A t  GFETC, the Health and Safety Manager s t i l l .  fee ls  tha t  there i s  a 
problem in getting HQ t o  take a serious view of SARS and assign a review 
person for  each safety analysis. In certain areas, such.as liquefaction 
programs, i t  i s  not c lear  who a t  HQ would be responsible for  receiving 
and. reviewing a safety analysis report. Since there are  only a few 
people who are  f ina l ly  responsible for  project authorization, i t  j s  f e l t  
that  these personnel and the i r  responsibli t ies need t o  be identified.  
This would avoid the problem of a f i e ld  off ice completing the safety 
analysis and not knowing t o  whom a t  HQ to  send i t ,  and i t  also would 
f a c i l i t a t e  the scheduling of reviews and open l ines  of communication 
between the report compiler and reviewer. This l a t t e r  point i s  of 
utmost importance i n  the case of high r isk projects since the review i s  
often an i t e ra t ive  process. I t  would be ineff ic ient  for  the reviewer to  
wait until the analysis were finalized before beginning the review; 
rather,  the reviewer should be involved i n .  the en t i re  cycl ical process. 
2.'3 LARAMIE ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CENTER (LETC) 
As o f  October 1980, t h e  t i m e  of t h e  s i t e  v i s i t  t o  LETC, t h e  LETC System 
Sa fe t y  Review Committee was n o t  ope ra t i ona l .  When a c t i v a t e d ,  i t  cou ld  
a s s i s t  LETC i n  compl iance w i t h  SARS requi rements f o r  i n d u s t r y  p r o j e c t s  
which a r e  managed by LETC under t h e  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  program. I n f o r m a t i o n  
ob ta ined  d u r i n g  t h e  course o f  t h i s  s i t e  v i s i t  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  
need f o r  more s p e c i f i c  i n f o r m a t i o n  and requi rements rega rd ing  SARS i n  
t h e  DOE Pro jec t /Task  Proposal Agreements ( PTPAs) between HQ ASFE and t h e  
Energy Technology Centers such as LETC. 
It appears t h a t  program o p p o r t u n i t y  n o t i c e s  be ing  prepared by LETC 
i n c l u d e  SARS.as p a r t  o f  t h e  ES&H requi rement  i n  a genera l  way. However, 
work statements seem t o  be inadequate i n  t h i s  r ega rd  because o f  a  l a c k  
o f  HQ guidance. There i s  a l s o  a  problem a t  LETC i n  t h a t  some o f  i t s  
c o n t r a c t s  a r e  managed b j  t h e  San Franc isco Operat ions O f f i c e .  These 
c o n t r a c t s  may be n e g o t i a t e d  between t h e  San Franc isco  Operat ions O f f i c e  
and t h e  c o n t r a c t o r  w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  re fe rence  t o  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  p r o j e c t  
personnel a t  LETC. I t  i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  need f o r  a  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  
o f  r o l e s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  i n  t h i s  regard.  
On t h e  i s sue  of sa fe t y  a n a l y s i s  rev iews,  i t  appears t h a t  i t  w i l l  be 
ex t reme ly  d i f f  i c u l  t t o  es tab l  i sh independent r ev i ew  panel s  a t  LETC. 
Th i s  i s  due t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  LETC Sa fe t y  Manager has been i n v o l v e d  
d i r e c t l y  i n  p r o j e c t  p l ann ing  f o r  s a f e t y  analyses. Ove ra l l ,  t h e r e  i s  a  
s c a r c i t y  o f  q u a l i f i e d  personnel who a r e  n o t  i n v o l v e d  a l r eady  i n  one 
manner o r  another  i n  a c t u a l  management o f  t h e  severa l  p r o j e c t s  f o r  which 
LETC i s  r espons ib l e .  
There a r e  a l s o  severe resource  c o n s t r a i n t s  i n  terms o f  s t a f f  and funds 
a v a i l a b l e  t o  per form rev iews,  even i f  independence cou ld  be ensured. 
Thus f a r ,  t h e  s a f e t y  a n a l y s i s  and rev iew  o f  t h e  Vernal  Tar  Sands exper iment 
have been completed. The a n a l y s i s  was compi led by S A I ,  and was rev iewed 
in-house by a  LETC rev iew  panel s i n c e . t h e  p r o j e c t  was deemed low r i s k .  
2.4 CHICAGO OPERATIONS AND REGIONAL OFFICE (CORO) 
CORO appears t o  have one o f  t h e  b e s t  organized SARS rev iew programs of 
those i n v e s t i g a t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  course o f  t h i s  s tudy.  However, l i k e  o t h e r  
DOE f i e l d  o rgan i za t i ons ,  CORO i s  faced w i t h  se r i ous  personnel and 'budgeta ry  
c o n s t r a i n t s .  T rave l  funds a r e  c r i t i c a l l y  l i m i t e d ,  makinu i t  d i f f i c u l t  
f o r  CORO t o  be u t i l i z e d  t o  per fo rm rev iews  o f  c e r t a i n  h i g h  r i s k  p r o j e c t s  
where s i l e  v i s i t s  would be impe ra t i ve .  
A t  the time of the v i s i t  to  CORO ( l a t e  1980), the off ice was performing 
the review of the safety analysis for  the University of Tennessee Space 
Ins t i tu te  Magnetohydrodynamics Project. When the safety analysis f i r s t  
was delivered to  CORO,  the Safety Coordinator received i t  and evaluated 
i t  from a systems safety viewpoint. Then i t  was sent to  other groups 
such as envi,ronmental and health protection for  review. If any safety 
analysis review needs to  cover areas in which the CORO s ta f f  lacks 
expertise. ( e .g . ,  tornadoes or  seismic e f f e c t s ) ,  the analysis may be sent,  
for instance, to Lawrence Livermore Laboratories or to  DOE H Q  for  
further evaluation. 
The review process for  the MHD analysis i s  an i t e ra t ive  one. After 
comments a re  incorporated into the analysis,  and the safety analysis 
report i s  considered acceptable, the Safety Coordinator will compile an 
evaluation report with a l l  comments attached to  outline the r isks  
involved i n  the operation. Under contract t o  DOE,  AFMA performed an 
informal safety analysis review of the M H D  safety analysis report.* 
Overall, the following weaknesses were identified: 
Hazards were equated with equipment fa i lures ,  the basic 
assumption being tha t  hazards resul t  from fa i lures  of equipment 
L i t t l e  or no consideration was given to  general occupational 
hazards such as walkways, ladders, and other typically non- 
f a i lu re  s i tuat ions.  
m Inadequate consideration was given to  environmental hazards. 
a Hazards analysis external t o  FMEA generally was absent. FMEA 
analysis alone i s  insuff ic ient  for  SARS. 
In general, i t  was found tha t  resolution o f .  the issues raised could 
require extensive revision of the safety analysis documentation. 
As previously s tated,  the major problem encountered by CORO in regard to 
SARS implementation i s  due to  resource constraints.  In addition, there 
needs t o  be a better mechanism for  ensuring that  CORO i s  notified of 
reviews i t  i s  t o  be required to  perform. 
2.5  U .  S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, HUNTSVILLE ( U S A E D H )  
Project management of the ICGG** and CONOCO*** programs u t i l i zes  the 
services of USAEDH, with whom DOE has a formal agreement, for  day-to-day 
project management services. During the v i s i t  t o  U S A E D H ,  i t  was learned 
*"Informal Safety Analysis Review of the University of Tennessee Space 
Ins t i tu te  Magnetohydrodynamics Project," January 1981. 
**High BTU Synthetic pipeline Gas Demonstration Plant " B "  
***High BTU Synthetic Pipeline Gas Demonstration Plant "A" 
t h a t  i t  does n o t  appear l i k e l y  t h a t  SARS w i l l  be imposed on CONOCO, and 
t h a t ,  i n  any event, i t  i s  t o o  l a t e  a  date t o  begin SARS implementat ion 
f o r  t h e  p r o j e c t .  I n  t h e  case o f  t h e  I C G G  p r o j e c t ,  an e f f o r t  had been 
begun as o f  l a t e  1980 t o  c o l l e c t  data necessary f o r  a  s a f e t y  ana l ys i s  t o  
be compiled. Since ESAAB a c t i o n  on t h e  I C G G  p r o j e c t  i s  scheduled f o r  
J u l y  30, 1980, i t  i s  necessary f o r  t h e  completed s a f e t y  ana l ys i s  t o  be 
reviewed by t h a t  t ime. Thus, due t o  t ime  cons t ra in t s ,  o n l y  about one 
month w i l l  be a l lowed f o r  independent rev iew of t h e  P re l im ina ry  Safe ty  
Ana lys is  Report  (PSAR) c u r r e n t l y  being prepared. 
Two l e v e l s  o f  rev iew a re  planned. USAEDH o r  a  c o n t r a c t o r  w i l l  p rov ide  
t h e  f i r s t  l e v e l .  There apparent ly  has been a  breakdown i n  communications 
between USAEDH and HQ ASFE i n  regard t o  who w i l l  p rov ide  t h e  independent 
rev iew ( i  . e. , t h e  second 1  eve1 o f  rev iew) .  According t o  USAEDH, HQ ASFE 
cou ld  arrange f o r  t h e  independent rev iew by drawing upon t h e  serv ices  
o f ,  f o r  example, t h e  Army Toxic  and Hazardous M a t e r i a l s  Agency. USAEDH 
i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  they  would r e q u i r e  a  minimum o f  e i g h t  months p r i o r  n o t i c e  
t o  make arrangements f o r  t h e  independent review. When no response was 
rece ived f rom HQ, USAEDH assumed t h a t  HQ ASFE planned t o  per form t h e  
I C G G  rev iew.  
According t o  t h e  D r a f t . F E  SARS Guidel ines,  t h e  O f f i c e  o f  Plans and 
Technology Assessment (OPTA) i s  charged w i t h  r e s p o n s i b i l  i ty f o r  managing 
t h e  HQ rev iew process. As such, they  obv ious ly  should have been aware 
o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  USAEDH was expec t ing  HQ t o  per form the  rev iew.  However, 
t h i s  was n o t  t h e  case; OPTA s t a f f  had n o t  been n o t i f i e d  t h a t  they  were 
expected t o  per form t h e  rev iew du r i ng  J u l y  1981. C lea r l y ,  some mechanism 
needs t o  be es tab l i shed  so t h a t  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i s  avoided i n  t h e  fu ture.  
It would seem t h a t  OPTA should have been consul ted.  be fore  t h e  dec i s i on  
was made f o r  HQ t o  perform t h e  review. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e r e  should be a  
system t o  ensure t h a t  OPTA i s  prov ided w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  l e a d  t ime  t o  
es tab l  i s h  rev iew panels and h i r e  any necessary consu l tan ts  f o r  those 
reviews which they  a r e  t o  be requ i red  t o  perform. 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, a greater degree of guidance and oversight of f i e ld  SARS 
e f fo r t s  i s  needed to ensure . that implementation of'DOE ,5481.1 i s  consis- 
tent  for  a l l  applicable FE operations. In addition, the following items 
need to  be considered: 
e There needs to  be a system whereby projects with SARS require- 
ments in the i r  contracts can be identified.  This will f a c i l i t a t e  
the funding and completion of the safety analysis and i t s  
review as well as th-e identification of projects '  SARS 
milestones. 
e Firm guidance i s  required from DOE H O  i n  regard to  items such 
as safety analysis content and format. There should also be a 
.decision made in regard to  the delegation of review authority 
fo r  moderate r isk operations. 
e Lines of communication should be identified so f i e ld  off ice 
personnel are  aware of to  whom they should forward completed 
analyses for  review. 
0 A detailed review of SARS requirements should be made in 
combination with a review of personnel and budgetary resources 
available to  f i l l  requirements, both a t  the f i e ld  and HQ 
1 eve1 s .  
